

We now turn to examination of the specific hypotheses listed.

### I. Cold War

- (a) The data could enter into their overall strategic appraisal of United States capabilities and intentions in such a way as to be to United States military, political, or economic disadvantage.

This question should be turned over to those units in CIA, State Department, and the Defense Department which are engaged in putting together overall strategic appraisals of the U.S.S.R. and other foreign countries.

It would seem to me that any well-rounded strategic appraisal of a foreign country would have an economic part, that this economic part would have a section describing the country's minerals position, and that columbium, zirconium, manganese, graphite, and tin import statistics would probably appear somewhere in the tables. I also think that it is probably vexatious to an analyst concerned with making these tables when he finds that he can't quite fill in all the boxes in his table or outline. If these surmises are correct, then it seems quite possible that the United States government could vex the Soviet government persons involved by suppressing United States columbium, graphite, manganese, tin, and zirconium import data.

Would the suppression of these data significantly impair the validity of the Soviet strategic appraisal of United States intentions and capabilities? So far as United States intentions go, this would seem to be a matter of public record. With respect to United States capabilities, this is a more difficult question. If one believes that the economic war potential of a great power must be appraised in such terms as labor force, productivity, composition of output, national income, capabilities in previous wars, etc. then knowledge that the United States imports about 30 million dollars per year of manganese, graphite, zirconium, and columbium combined and 200 or 300 million dollars of tin does not enter into the appraisal of economic war potential. If on the other hand one takes the view that the nation's economic war potential would be much different if this import transaction were not taking place, then the information is obviously relevant to calculation of economic war potential.

Let us now assume for the moment, despite the fact that these imports represent in value terms only about 1/10 of one percent of the United States gross national product, that nevertheless the nation's economic war potential would be as much as ten percent different if these import transactions were not taking place. Would this different estimate of United States capability on the part of the Soviet Union produce any difference in their behavior during the cold war? In effect they would be estimating that United States economic potential was three times as large as that of the Soviet Union as opposed to three and one third times -- how would this affect their behavior?

In conclusion of our discussion under this heading, it would appear that the subject information is useful to the U.S.S.R. in the sense that it enters the body of facts which they have on the United States. But it would also appear that there is no disadvantage to the United States in this occurring. These data manifest neither unique vulnerability nor any unique strength on the part of the United States.

- (b) The data could benefit their current military, political, or economic operations during the cold war in such way that they could render hurt to the United States.

Under this heading we have the interesting possibility that the Soviet Union could attempt by covert means to win the supplying nations to their camp in order to deny the supplies to the United States; or that they might by open diplomacy or military threat attempt to achieve the same result. Here again we have a question which could ~~not~~ be answered by those who play the United States game of high military and political strategy, and I would suggest that the question be put to the appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department organizations.

To a non-expert like myself, it would seem that the Soviet Union is already engaged in as much covert activity, as much military threat activity, as much political seduction, as is within their power, so that no intensification of ~~these~~ may be expected from the continuance of the publication of the ~~relevant~~ import data. It would also seem that if the Soviet Union already were committed, on grounds other than the fact that Africa and Asia supply the bulk of the materials under consideration, to programs designed to bring these continents under Soviet control, that the additional information of United States use of supplies from these continents would mean little more than a dab of frosting on the cake. But on the other hand if they did not already have such operations under way, it would seem unlikely that they would undertake them for the purpose of interfering with the supply of the subject commodities to the United States.

We now turn to a consideration of hypotheses relevant to the case of hot war.

## II. Hot War

- (a) The import data for the several years preceding the war can, in some significant way which will be injurious to United States, enter into the Soviet war strategy.

Assume now that we are at war with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union is considering possible directions in which to move in a military way. They are, for example, thinking of launching a campaign against the Gold Coast and the Union of South Africa on the one hand vs. launching a campaign against Central America on the other. They have observed that in the last year preceding the outbreak of war a considerable volume of the cited materials were received from the African countries. Would decision to invade be one way if they had this information for the several years preceding war and the other way if they did not have this information for the several years preceding the war?

Or conceive that the question which confronts these Soviet strategists is, now that war has broken out, whether to emphasize a building up of the submarine fleet at the expense of the strategic air force or the reverse. Is their decision any different from knowing for the several years

preceding the war import statistics with respect to these commodities? It might be with respect to a war several years from now that the plans are already pretty well drawn, and that the non-availability of these particular import data would not significantly affect the allocation of resources to the various services.

But I must confess to not knowing exactly how campaign plans are decided during a war, and therefore cannot contribute to a discussion under this heading.

- (b) The data will become part of operational intelligence and will thereby increase Soviet knowledge of United States order of battle, troop and equipment dispositions, weapon and other military equipment characteristics, etc.; and this increased knowledge on the part of the Soviets will hamper and make more costly United States military operations.

This is a question which the order of battle and technical intelligence people could best handle. To the best of my ability to know, order of battle information requires identification of units, extent to which units are up to strength, disposition of units, tables of equipment, etc. None of these types of information are divulged by knowledge of the import statistics for several years preceding of the five commodities in question. The data would not, it would seem, be relevant to operational intelligence of the type considered.

- (c) These data will be valuable target information for strategic bombing and thereby increase the damage the United States will experience from any given bombing effort.

On this question, since the United States is the leading strategic bombing power at present and was during the last war, and since a large amount of material has been published, it is possible to give more definitive answers.

The first major type of information which is needed with respect to strategic bombing is that which will enable a wise decision on the proportion of the nation's resources to be allocated to the strategic bombing arm. Import statistics on the commodities mentioned do not affect this decision.

The second type of information needed is that which will enable the strategic air arm to select target systems or families which will maximize damage to an enemy from any given effort. Large cities vs. industries, ports vs. steel industry vs. the automobile industry etc., marshalling yards vs. ship building facilities, and the like, are examples of the choice which has to be made among target systems. With respect to one of these, the target system ports, an appraisal of this system does require some knowledge of the traffic handled and of the significance of the ports to the United States war effort. The relevant data of number of ports and capacity of each of them would not, however, have to include detail on the actual tonnages or values of the five commodities named here. Since the tonnages imported are, relative to the total capacity of United States ports, quite small, the fact

is that no conceivable level of damage to United States ports -- for example 50 percent of all capacity destroyed -- could prevent the United States from receiving and unloading any specific types of cargo they chose to makeup 50 percent of capacity remaining. Port attack, that is, could not deny the United States economy the volumes of materials considered here.

The third type of information relevant for strategic bombing is that which is necessary once a target system is chosen. If for example the automobile manufacturing plants of the nation are chosen as the target system, then it becomes quite important to be able to identify the capacity of each of the automobile plants, to have aerial photographs of the plants for the target folders, to have actual pin point coordinates, to know work force, specialized equipment, specific types of vehicles produced, etc. This level of information, in short, is that which permits the choosing of one plant over another, and then makes it possible for airplane crews to locate and hit the plants. The import information under consideration would not bear on this type of economic-operational intelligence. The type of intelligence which is relevant here consists of large scale maps, aerial photographs, street and address directories, trade directories, telephone books, and news stories of the awards of contracts of various sizes of various types to specific plants.

- (d) Assuming that the U.S.S.R. will engage in submarine attack on merchant shipping, these import data will be valuable target information and will increase the effectiveness of such attack.

It would seem that the organization best equipped to evaluate the significance of this type of information for submarine attack would be the relevant United States Navy unit. Speaking again as a layman, I should have thought that the information which submarines need for attack on merchant shipping would be data on shipping lanes or routes, specific arrival and departure times, assembly points, information on extent of air or naval escort protection, and the like. It is possible of course that the import information for the five commodities could be useful to the enemy, but visualizing this information as being published with a several month time lag and consisting of totals for the United States rather itemizations by ports it is not obvious that this could be very fruitful for submarine operations.

- (e) Assuming that the U.S.S.R. will engage in sabotage attack against United States military and economic isolations, these data will, by providing valuable sabotage information, increase the damage which the U.S.S.R. can achieve with any given outlay of resources on sabotage.

In general, the U.S.S.R. will need information of the type described under the air targets category above, with particular emphasis on the latter. They will need, that is, specific information for target systems selection and they will require very detailed information on particular plants for sabotage.

It should be noted, however, that sabotage target information needs differ from the strategic bombing intelligence needs in these respects. First,

it is rarely possible for sabotage efforts to be so large-scale, systematic, and coordinated in time as to, in fact, comprise attack on a target "system". Sabotage, for example, could not damage and keep out of action for a sustained period 80 or 90 percent of an oil industry nor simultaneously eliminate all (say 20) rail bridges to a particular area, as bombing did in Germany and for the area bounded by the Seine-Loire, respectively in the last war. Since the systematic elimination of a major sector of the economy is beyond the capability of sabotage effort, then sabotage requires less of the target "system" type of intelligence than air attack. Second, sabotage intelligence needs are usually much more detailed at a plant level than strategic bombing needs (exception must be made for the possibility of using atomic bombs in sabotage). Whereas strategic bombing intelligence analysts might want to use the water gas generators or the hydrogenation stalls as aiming points in a Bergius plant, sabotage intelligence officers would want to know, in addition, points of access to plant, guard details, particular structural members to which to attach explosives, etc.

It would not seem that overall import information of the type under discussion could be useful for sabotage target information.

- (f) Assuming: (i) That the countries from which we would buy these commodities during war would be neutral during the war, and (ii) that the U.S.S.R. would have the political and economic means to engage in significant preemptive buying effort during the war, these import data in question will provide the information needed by the Russians in their successful effort to deny necessary supplies to the United States.

Table one indicates the countries from which the United States imported the various commodities in the year 1949. The table also shows which of these countries are associated with the United States in the North Atlantic or some other military or political alliance. It will be observed that the major portion of these supplies are received by the United States from countries within the United States orbit, that virtually none of the supplies are received from iron curtain countries, and that only a portion of the supplies maybe characterized as coming from countries which are neutral. It is only with respect to the countries that are neutral that the Soviet Union could be expected to have leverage for preemptive buying. With respect to the iron curtain countries, of course, they would not even have to engage in preemptive buying -- they would merely instruct the cessation of export to the United States.

It should be noted, however, with respect to the countries designated as neutral, above, with which the Russians could engage in preemptive buying negotiations during a war, that it would be impossible to conceal the volume of exports by these countries during the several years before the war. If for example India is conceived of as one country which refuses to align itself with either the U.S.S.R. or the United States power blocks, then it is probable that India is a country which will refuse to suppress statistics on exports to the United States. It is also likely even if the United States exerted duress great enough to force the neutral into suppression that the security control over such data in such a country would be more like a sieve than a cover.

Although it may be observed that information through say the year 1950 would be available whether or not United States import data by specific countries were suppressed during the next few years, it is nevertheless true that for preemptive buying operations it is highly important that the information be very very current. It is possible, that is, as the United States learned with respect to its own preemptive buying operations during the last war, to do virtually no harm to the enemy by preemptive buying unless one is clear exactly what it is that the enemy needs from the neutral country at the specific time. It would seem conceivable, although not likely, then that import information by countries could under certain circumstances be of use to the enemy for preemptive buying operations by him during the war.

It should be noted finally that, to the extent that the foreign supplying firms are owned by British, American, or other Western power companies, the preemptive buying leverage which Russia has is reduced.

- (g) Assuming the Russians can engage in successful naval blockade efforts (other than by the submarine attack discussed above) during the war, these data will make such blockade efforts more successful in damaging the U. S. than they would otherwise be.

Since the classic role of the U. S. and British navies is to keep the sea lanes open for shipping, it would seem that the Russians would have to eliminate the combined fleets of the Western powers before they could undertake significantly to interfere with imports of the commodities named. No blockade of the U. S. would of course ever be attempted for the keeping out of the five commodities named but rather for the prevention of ocean traffic of all commodities. I suggest, for example, that the Russians would much rather interfere with military shipments to and from the U. S. than with the shipment of ores. The Navy would have views as to Russian ability to blockade the U. S. and allied nations.

As to how important would be the information on the imports of these five commodities during the years immediately preceding the war, I find it quite difficult to answer. Unlike the larger global analyses referred to earlier, these data on imports would become quite important parts of the larger analyses for blockade strategy. It should be pointed out, with respect to tin, that the older preexisting data through 1950 will tell the Russians all they have to know about the U. S. tin import requirement, since, barring major mishap of the type which prevented imports of rubber during the last war, the tin requirement has to be met from the outside. There just are not the necessary tin resources within the U. S. proper. The situation is somewhat the same, although not quite as stringent, with respect to manganese. In this case the manganese does exist in the U. S., but the problem is that the U. S. reserves, given present technology, are not economical relative to outside ones.

It should be noted with respect to certain of the commodities, for example columbium, that the requirement is so small that it could be satisfied by, for example, airlift from the originating country, thus by-passing naval blockade.

### III. Concluding Remarks

It should be pointed out that in no case have we been concerned about the extent to which import data on the relevant commodities would divulge production data of weapons, provide an index of general industrial activity, or otherwise betoken some very major military information. The fact is that in no case would anything be divulged by these import data with respect to production which is not already public information. Since information on steel production and steel goals is public, for example, it is somewhat irrelevant that manganese imports tend to divulge data on steel production.

As a second matter it would appear from our foregoing analysis that if grounds were found for suppression of certain of the information, they would be on the basis that very current information of the type considered should not be available to the U.S.S.R., and that a lag of, say, three to six months in the publication of the data might be sufficient to overcome the objections to free publication.

Third, reference should be made to the fact that the import information is in one sense considerably less important than the production and consumption information, both of which continue to be free even if the imports are suppressed.

Fourth, there is apparently a generalized concern about these data, which stems from a fear that, in some way or other and despite United States naval dominance in the world today, the U.S.S.R. could deny the United States supplies from overseas. If this surmise about the concern is correct, it might be useful if the data were analyzed in terms of the friendliness of the nation which controls the source of supply, the geographical location (for example, Western Hemisphere), the availability of other resources—perhaps less economical but nevertheless usable—in safer locations or under safer control, the commitment of the military establishment to protecting other shipping along the lanes concerned, and so on.

Finally, if there is the generalized concern just cited, then consideration should be given to whether it is not largely a fear emotion, rather than a reasoned concern. We of the Free World depend upon the seas and upon our trade and communication with each other. It is not at all obvious that this mutual dependence on one another is a vulnerability. In a certain significant sense, this is the strength of the Free World and the vulnerability of the Soviet Union.

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